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Abstract
Making use of a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with private and public
rms, this paper examines the welfare eects of privatization. We show that in an
exogenous market structure privatizing the public rm necessarily reduces welfare,
which contrasts with the existing result that some degree of privatization is optimal.
In contrast, we nd that privatization has no eect on welfare in an endogenous
market structure with free entry of private rms.
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1 Introduction
Privatization of public or state-owned rms has been as controversial as the other liberal-
ization policies, e.g. competition and trade policies.1 Reason Foundation (2015) reports
the latest cases of successful privatization in the United States in 2014.2 Moreover, 'Many
emerging economies have launched ambitious eorts to privatize their infrastructure in-
dustries' (Jiang et al., 2015, p. 294) in order to provide multinational enterprises with
investment opportunities.
These facts motivate a large literature on the eects of privatization mainly in the
context of a mixed oligopoly.3 This literature begins with de Fraja and Delbono (1989)
who show that moving from full nationalization to full privatization improves welfare.
By allowing for the intermediate case between full nationalization and full privatization,
Matsumura (1998) nds that partial privatization is optimal (welfare-maximizing). In
addition to the eects of privatization alone, White (1996) examines the interplay between
privatization and subsidization, demonstrating that privatization has no eect on the
optimal production subsidy when the government subsidizes both the state-owned and
private rms.4
This strand of literature gives rise to a number of useful implications, but they rest
on a partial equilibrium model. The purpose of this paper is to examine the welfare
eects of privatization by taking into account the general equilibrium eects through the
factor market. To this end, we combine Matsumura's (1998) approach with the general
oligopolistic equilibrium (GOLE) model of Neary (2003, 2009).5 We establish two results
both of which are comparable to the existing ndings. First, privatization necessarily
reduces welfare in an exogenous market structure with xed number of private rms.
1In this paper, we interchangeably use the terminologies `public rm' and `state-owned rm.'
2According to this report, 'The U.S. Department of Agriculture announced a plan to privatize poultry
inspection in 2014,' and 'The General Services Administration announced in January it is closing its
warehouses    and will no longer buy, ship or store oce supplies, tools and other common-use retail
items in favor of accepting agency orders.'
3For an extensive literature survey, see Matsumura and Shimizu (2010) and Matsumura and Tomaru
(2012). Cato and Matsumura (2015) provide a further review by paying special attention to the open
economy case.
4This 'irrelevance result' or 'Privatization Neutrality Theorem' has been challenged by many works,
which are surveyed in Matsumura and Okumura (2013) in detail.
5Colacicco (2015) provides a comprehensive survey on the theory and applications of the GOLE model.
Beladi et al. (2013) develop a mixed GOLE model, but their focus is on the incentive of cross-border
mergers in the presence of a public rm.
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Second, privatization has no eect on welfare in an endogenous market structure with
free entry among private rms.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a basic model of a mixed
oligopoly with an exogenous market structure. Then, Section 3 examines the eects of
privatization on national income and welfare. Section 4 turns to the case of endogenous
market structure. Section 5 concludes.
2 Model with Exogenous Market Structure
Suppose a continuum of industries in a closed interval [0; 1], each consisting of one semi-
public rm and n  1 private rms. Letting ci be consumption of good i 2 [0; 1], the
representative consumer solves the following utility maximization problem.6
max
ci
Z 1
0
 
aci   c
2
i
2
!
di subject to
Z 1
0
picidi = I;
where I is national income. Then, the rst-order condition yields a   ci = pi, where 
is the Lagrangean multiplier and stands for marginal utility of income. Following Neary
(2003, 2009), we assume that oligopolistic rms have market power in their product
market, but do not in the whole economy. And, we can set  to unity by taking utility
as numeraire. Then, indirect utility or welfare W has a simple form:
W =
a2   2p
2
; where 2p 
Z 1
0
p2i di: (1)
We now dene the prot of each rm. In industry i, rms use labor under the xed
labor coecient i, which gives the following denitions of prots:
i0  pixi0   wixi0
ij  pixij   wixij;
where the inverse demand function is pi = a   xi0  Pnj=i xij, w is a wage rate, and xi0
and xij; j = 1;    ; n are the output of the semi-public rm (rm 0) and a private rm j,
respectively. Following the standard approach since Matsumura (1998), the semi-public
rm maximizes the weighted sum of welfare and its own prot W +(1 )i0;  2 [0; 1]
6We use a simpler notation ci instead of c(i).
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whereas the private rms maximize their prots. Then, denoting by xi1 the common
output of the n private rms, the rst-order conditions for the Cournot equilibrium are
a  wi   (1 + )xi0   nxi1 = 0
a  wi   xi0   (n+ 1)xi1 = 0;
which yields the equilibrium outputs:
xi0 =
a  wi[(n+ 1)   n]
1 + (n+ 1)
; xi1 =
a  wi
1 + (n+ 1)
: (2)
The model is closed by introducing the labor market-clearing condition:Z 1
0
i(xi0 + nxi1)di =
(1 + n)a  (n+ 1)2w
1 + (n+ 1)
= l; (3)
where   R 10 idi, 2  R 10 2i di, and l is the labor endowment. Solving this equation for
w, the equilibrium wage rate is obtained as
w =
(1 + n)a  [1 + (n+ 1)]l
(n+ 1)2
; (4)
which immediately leads to:
Proposition 1. Privatization decreases the wage.
Proof. Dierentiating (4) with respect to  gives
@w
@
=   a  l
(n+ 1)22
< 0:
jj
The intuition underlying this result is as follows. If  rises, output of the public
rm decreases, output of the private rms increases, and total output of each industry
decreases.7 Thus, the wage rate declines as a result of privatization since privatization
7The eect of privatization on outputs is given by
@xi0
@
=   (n+ 1)[a+ (n+ 1)wi]
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
< 0
@xi1
@
=
a+ (n+ 1)wi
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
> 0
@(xi0 + nxi1)
@
=  a+ (n+ 1)wi
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
< 0:
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reduces labor demand in all industries. This eect of privatization on the wage, which
is overlooked in the existing literature, will play an important role behind the eects of
privatization on income distribution and welfare.
3 Privatization, National Income and Welfare
This section examines the eects of privatization on national income and welfare. We
begin with the eect on national income, and then proceed to the welfare eect.
Substituting the equilibrium outputs (2) into the inverse demand function, we have
pi = a  xi0   nxi1 = a+ (n+ 1)wi
1 + (n+ 1)
:
Then, the aggregate prots in the whole economy, which is denoted by , are computed
as
 
Z 1
0
(i0 + ni1)di
=
Z 1
0
(pi   wi)(xi0 + nxi1)di
=
Z 1
0
(
(a  wi)[(1 + n)a  (n+ 1)wi]
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
)
di
=
Z 1
0
(
(1 + n)a2   [(n+ 1)2 + n + 1] awi + (n+ 1)w22i
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
)
di
=
(1 + n)a2   [(n+ 1)2 + n + 1] aw+ (n+ 1)w22
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
: (5)
Thus, substituting (4) into (5) and making a lengthy manipulation lead to:
 =

(n+ 1)[1 + (n+ 1)]22
(6)
 

2   2

(1 + n)(1 + n)2a2 + [1 + (n+ 1)]
nh
(n+ 1)2   n   1
i
a+ [1 + (n+ 1)]l
o
l:
The eect of privatization on the aggregate prot is summarizes as follows.
Proposition 2. Privatization strictly increases the aggregate prots.
The proof of this result will be postponed after addressing the eect on national income
since straightforward dierentiation of (6) involves a quite complicated manipulation.
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The reason why privatization increases the aggregate prot is explained as follows.
As shown in Proposition 1, privatization reduces the wage rate. The resulting decline in
wage rate leads to a decline in marginal cost in each industry, and hence all rms have
an incentive to produce more. Therefore, private rms can make more prots since they
increase output as a result of the rst-order eect of privatization, and their marginal
cost decrease as the second-order eect. While the eect on the prot of the public rm
is ambiguous, the positive eect on the private rms' prots plays a dominant role in the
industry-wide prot, and thereby the aggregate prot increases after privatization.
The national income I consists of labor income wl and the aggregate prot . By
making use of (4) and (6), I is computed as
I = wl + =
(2   2) (1 + n)a2
[1 + (n+ 1)]22
+
(a  l)l
2
: (7)
Eq. (7) allows us to claim that:
Proposition 3. Privatization increases the national income, strictly so if 2   2 > 0.
Proof. Immediately from
@I
@
=
(2   2) [1 + (n  1)]a2
[1 + (n+ 1)]32
 0;
with a strict inequality if 2   2 > 0. jj
Note that Proposition 2 follows from this result; privatization necessarily increases the
aggregate prot because it decreases the labor income but increases the national income.
Propositions 1 and 2 suggest an income distribution eect of privatization such that
privatization has a negative eect on labor income but a positive eect on the aggregate
prot. However, according to Proposition 3, privatization leads to an increase in national
income since the positive eect on the aggregate prot is larger than the negative eect
on the labor income.
Let us move on to the welfare eect of privatization. Applying the preceding argu-
ments to Eq. (1), 2p becomes
2p =
Z 1
0
"
a+ (n+ 1)wi
1 + (n+ 1)
#2
di
6
=
Z 1
0
(
2a2 + 2(n+ 1)2awi + (n+ 1)
22w22i
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
)
di
=
2a2 + 2(n+ 1)2aw+ (n+ 1)22w22
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
=
1
2
(
(2   2) 2a2
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
+ (a  l)2
)
=
1
2
(
(2   2) a2
(1= + n+ 1)2
+ (a  l)2
)
: (8)
Hence, we easily nd that 2p is increasing in , and arrive at:
Proposition 4. Privatization decreases welfare, strictly so if 2   2 > 0.
This result is intuitively interpreted as follows. As mentioned earlier, privatization
leads total output in each industry to decline, and hence the good price rises. Meanwhile,
privatization has a second-order eect such that the wage rate and marginal cost of all
rms decline. This induces all rms to produce more, and the upward pressure for good
prices is mitigated. But, because the rst-order eect on good prices is stronger than the
second-order eect, privatization ends up raising good prices and reducing welfare.
What Proposition 4 suggests is that full nationalization is the best policy from the
welfare point of view. However, we must carefully recognize that this extreme outcome
rests on a number of simplifying assumptions. Among others, we guess that the assump-
tion of homogeneous products (perfect substitutes) is crucial for this nding. If product
dierentiation within/across industries is allowed, some degree of privatization may be
optimal as is conrmed in the existing literature, e.g. Fujiwara (2007).
4 Endogenous Market Structure
Thus far, we have focused on the case of exogenous market structure, i.e. the number
of (private) rms is exogenously given. Relaxing this assumption, this section turns to
the case of endogenous market structure in which the number of rms is endogenously
determined by the zero prot condition. Following Neary (2003), we simply assume that
all the private rms have to incur a xed cost f > 0 in entering the market. Then, the
7
maximized prot of private rms is
i1 = x
2
i1   f =
"
a  wi
1 + (n+ 1)
#2
  f;
where the last equation comes from (2). Solving this equation for n yields
n =
a  wi

p
f
  1

  1;
which is shown to be increasing in , that is, privatization increases the number of rms.8
Combining these results with the equilibrium outputs in (2), we have
xi0 =
p
f + (1  )wi

; nxi1 =
a  wi   (1 + )
p
f

;
and the labor market-clearing condition becomes
int10i (xi0 + nxi1) di =

a 
q
f

  w2 = l:
Hence, the equilibrium wage rate in the free entry case is
w =

a pf

  l
2
: (9)
Note that the labor market-clearing wage rate does not depend on the degree of priva-
tization , i.e. privatization has no eect on the labor income. This is a notable result
in the free entry case, and the reason behind it is as follows. As noted after Proposition
1, privatization puts downward pressure on the wage rate by decreasing industry output.
In addition to this eect, privatization inuences the equilibrium wage rate through the
change in the number of private rms. Dierentiating n above with respect to , we nd
that privatization induces entry. While new entry has a business-stealing eect such that
it reduces all rms' output, industry output xi0+nxi1 increases. Therefore, privatization
has a positive eect on labor demand as a direct eect, and a negative eect as an indi-
rect eect by inducing entry. In our model, these two conicting eects just oset, and
thereby the equilibrium wage rate remains unchanged before and after privatization.9
8Note that dn=d =
 
wi +
p
f

=
 
2
p
f

> 0:
9Algebraically, the overall eect of privatization on industry output is computed as follows.
d(xi0 + nxi1)
d
=
@(xi0 + nxi1)
@
+
@(xi0 + nxi1)
@n
 dn
d
=  a+ (n+ 1)wi
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
+
a+ (n+ 1)wi
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
= 0:
8
Making the manipulations parallel to those in the restricted entry case, the aggregate
prot becomes
 
Z 1
0
(i0 + ni1) di =
Z 1
0
i0di
=
Z 1
0
(pi   wi)xi0di
=
p
f
n
2
p
f + (1  )
h
a pf

  l
io
2
: (10)
Noting that the privatization has no eect on the labor income wl, the eect of privati-
zation on national income I  wl + is the same as that on , and given by
@I
@
=
@
@
=  (
2   2) f + pf(a  l)
22
< 0:
That is, privatization ends up decreasing national income as is the opposite to the case of
exogenous market structure. This is because the public rm's output decreases not only
as a direct eect of privatization but also as an indirect eect through business-stealing.10
Finally, let us address the welfare eect of privatization in the case of endogenous
market structure. Since the price of each good becomes
pi = a  xi0   nxi1 =
2
p
f + i
h
a pf

  l
i
2
;
2p in (1) is derived as follows.
2p =
Z 1
0
p2i di =
(2   2) f + (a  l)2
2
: (11)
This equation tells that welfare is not aected by privatization. The underlying intuition
is straightforward once noting that privatization has no eect on industry output. Sum-
marizing the preceding arguments, we establish:
Proposition 5. In the endogenous market structure, privatization has no eect on the
labor income and welfare while decreasing the aggregate prot and the national income.
10This is mathematically proved as follows.
dxi0
d
=
@xi0
@
+
@xi0
@n
 dn
d
=   [1 + (n+ 1)][a+ (n+ 1)wi]
[1 + (n+ 1)]2
< 0:
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5 Conclusion
This paper has applied the general oligopolistic equilibrium model of Neary (2003) to the
welfare eects of privatization. The main ndings are that (i) privatization inevitably
worsens welfare in the exogenous market structure (with restricted entry of private rms)
and that (ii) privatization has no eect on welfare in the endogenous market structure
(with free entry of private rms). Both of these results may shed new light on the ongoing
debate over privatization since they are contrasting to the existing results that partial
privatization is optimal (see Matsumura, 1998 and Matsumura and Kanda, 2005).
However, we admittedly recognize that the above results are so extreme that they
are of little applicability to the practical policymaking. This is mainly because we have
assumed that all sectors are symmetric except for cost parameter i and that products in
each industry are homogeneous (perfect substitute). It is our important research agenda
to reexamine the eects of privatization by relaxing these simplifying assumptions.
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